Source: blog.gitguardian.com/shai-hulu… (GitGuardian, 22 Jul 2026)
Between early June and 14 July 2026, four distinct supply-chain campaigns targeted npm and PyPI, all converging on the same objective: harvesting credentials from developer environments and CI pipelines. The Miasma worm continued spreading on npm (reaching packages such as the Vapi server SDK) while a PyPI variant branded “Hades” used *.pth startup files to deploy the same self-propagating credential stealer. Concurrently, JFrog uncovered IronWorm, a Rust-based infostealer planted in 36 npm packages that leveraged an eBPF rootkit and stolen publishing tokens. Two later campaigns used typosquatted payment SDKs (PaySafe, Skrill, Neteller) to silently exfiltrate CI secrets, and a stolen npm token that poisoned multiple versions of the popular jscrambler package and its plugins.
The most damaging incident compromised AsyncAPI’s own CI via a long-known pull_request_target workflow flaw. Attackers stole a high-privilege bot token, published four packages (combined >2.25 million weekly downloads) that carried valid Sigstore/SLSA provenance because the legitimate pipeline itself signed the malware. Payloads across the campaigns targeted cloud keys, GitHub/npm tokens, AI coding assistant credentials, crypto wallets, and browser data, underscoring that ecosystem-level protections (install-script defaults, provenance) still cannot detect a compromised identity.